Alexander Almazov

The garrison of the Russian «military people» of Nizhyn in February 1668, after the start of the revolt under the leadership of Hetman I.M. Briukhovetsky came under siege in the "upper earthen city" (the castle), while the «big city» remained in the hands of the insurgent Cossacks and townspeople. This siege was the longest in the second half of the XVII century for the Russian garrison –it lasted more than 10 months, so the besieged people needed to mobilize sufficient material and human resources to withstand it. During the siege, the way of life of the garrison changed significantly: trade with the Nizhyn townspeople was interrupted, Nizhyn artisans stopped making products on the order of the voivode, the dietary diversity became not sufficient – there was not enough meat and vegetables, wounds, illness and death became part of everyday life. Moreover, the garrison throughout the siege had no a shortage of grain, and in September 1668 its reserves were replenished. The situation was more complicated with salt: in order to avoid its shortage in the households of the besieged people, the voivode had to increase the salt salary. It was urgent need under the siege to provide the medical care to the Strelstsy: they are not only injured during attacks and fending  of attacks, but suffered from scurvy and hemeralopia due to a lack of a dietary diversity. This problem was solved due to the fact that the side of the besieged passed "tsyriulik" Stefan Komyshevich. During the siege have also changed the way of life of the Streltsy wives and widows – they participated in excavations and get a salary to offset the remuneration of their husbands. Despite the hardships of the siege life, the besieged people found time for rest and entertainment: continued to take place the wedding ceremony, decreased, but did not stop at all, the use of alcoholic beverages.

The reply of Boyar Vasilii Vasilievich Golitsyn is devoted to the description of the
Council of Kolomak (1687). Scholars used this document previously as a source but, as a
rule, not on the history of the Council of Kolomak. Boyar Golitsyn’s reply contains many
valuable details of the procedure of the oath of the elected Hetman Ivan Mazepa. It also
gives the names of the nobles who were sent to Moscow with news on the results of the
Council of Kolomak. The Kolomak Articles were sent for signing to the Ukrainian Church
hierarchy who were absent at the council.

The author examines the functions of Russian voivodas in the town of
Nezhin between the mid-17th and early 18th centuries and the role the voivoda administration played in the integration of Ukrainian lands into Russia. The author introduces previously unstudied sources, such as Nezhin voivodas’ correspondence with the Little Russia Prikaz and economic documents drawn up in the local office. He demonstrates that, in terms of the Ukrainian population, Nezhin voivodas had neither administrative nor legal power: their functions were limited to the taxation of Nezhin burghers and peasants (between 1666 and 1668). In legal cases where one of the parties was represented by Cossacks
or townspeople and the other by military men of the garrison, voivodas judged them together with Nezhin regimental officers and communal authorities. The author states that only in certain cases could voivodas arrest Ukrainian Cossacks, burghers, and peasants accused of treason against the tsar. The author focuses on voivodas’ functions in the administration of the military garrison: they led the defence of the castle during sieges, prevented service people from escaping the
town, and maintained the town fortifications in peace and wartime. Together with their military duties, voivodas managed the local office, dealt with the return of runaway serfs to their owners, and reported sensitive information that concerned the state of affairs in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Right-bank Ukraine to Moscow. Moreover, the voivodas also had to handle a number of economic issues, like purchasing grain for the garrison, supporting its activity, and controlling the distribution of income received by the tavern.

Работа представляет собой доклад, прочитанный в рамках семинара «Пути формирования национального самосознания элиты Левобережной Украины в конце XVII в.», состоявшегося 22 февраля 2018 г. в Лаборатории медиевистических исследований НИУ "Высшая школа экономики". С текстом доклада можно также ознакомиться на сайте Лаборатории: https://medieval.hse.ru/news/217235166.html

The article examines the state of knowledge of the issues
connected to the presence of Russian Waywodes in
Ukrainian towns during the second half of the XVII c. The
author discusses those specific questions which have not
been resolved in historiographical analysis. The questions
include the order of assignment and shift of the Waywodes,
their areas of responsibilities, their conflicts with local authorities and their service rewards.

Алмазов А. Осада «верхнего земляного города» Нежина во время Украинского восстания 1668 г. [Электронный ресурс] — Режим доступа: http://historians.in.ua/index.php/en/doslidzhennya/1883-aleksandr-almazov-osada-verkhnego-zemlyanogo-goroda-nezhina-vo-vremya-ukrainskogo-vosstaniya-1668-g

The paper is devoted to considering the question about the role of agents of hetman of Left-Bank Ukraine Ivan Samoylovych in collecting of information about the situation  in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the period when he was in office (1672-1687). The staff of agents was mostly nonprofessional (townsmen, clerks etc.), only for Cossacks collection of information was a kind of duty of service. Hetman I. Samoylovych also co-operated with Russian central power for gathering of evidences of informants. For hetman’s agents, as a rule, weren’t special procedure of recruitment, but as one may be used oaths and kissing of icons. One of the most commonly used method of working of intelligencers was talk with an informed person. Also they were usually sending Constitutions of General Sejms of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Zaporozhian Host’s hetman and starshyna had much concern with decisions of Sejms of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth because of its determinant role in the power system of Poland. Hetman of Left-Bank Ukraine also interested in information about disposition and transportation of Polish troops, location of kings and other officials of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Ukrainian Cossacks on the Polish service, negotiations with Russian representatives etc.
The analysis of the believability of the information (there was analyzed some examples of evidences) represented in the article let to conclude, that reliable enough information was being gathered by intelligencers using talk with informed persons, the least reliable information was being collected from rumors. Hetman Ivan Samoylovych and his entourage were examining reliability of information which was being gathered by agents. As a result, the hetman had rather true notion of situation in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that let him to base his position about Russian-Polish relations for Moscow. The I. Samoylovych’s estimation and his advice in that question were overrated by Moscow officials.
The system of the collection and the analysis of agents’ evidences was well-functioned, that was indicated hetman’s showy talents.

The paper is devoted to considering the question of role commanders of the Streltsy unit of in the Russian-Ukrainian relations. The question is considered by examination of functions of commanders of the Streltsy unit and how ones appear at Baturyn.

Алмазов А. Некоторые мысли по поводу книги Д.А. Безьева «Малороссийский приказ: причины создания, штаты, основные направления деятельности. М.: Прометей, 2015». [Электронный ресурс] — Режим доступа: http://historians.in.ua/index.php/en/dyskusiya/1996-aleksandr-almazov-nekotorye-mysli-po-povodu-knigi-d-a-bez-eva-malorossijskij-prikaz-prichiny-sozdaniya-shtaty-osnovnye-napravleniya-deyatel-nosti-m-prometej-2015